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even visited a major US city, as had a large number of my new
college acquaintances.  My high school curriculum was very
limited, and I felt deeply ignorant next to fellow students who
had taken calculus, economics, psychology — even
philosophy — in high school.  Although my politics were by
no means clear to me, I was beginning to see that with respect
to both political and religious values, I was on the verge of a
great break with the traditions in which I had been raised, in a
process that had already left me feeling alienated from and
rejected by my hometown community.  (I often wonder how
many contemporary communitarians grew up in a small
town.)  It was therefore extremely valuable to me to discover
a subject in which my background did not matter, in which I
was encouraged to think that I could — and should —
construct myself according to my own deepest understanding.
The idea that I was entitled to autonomy was a notion that I
had to work hard to absorb —  it was not my birthright.  It is an
oft-cited aspect of the experience of marginality that the
marginalized person is not permitted any individuality, but is
instead taken as an exemplar for the group — individuality,
the privilege of constructing oneself — is one of the
prerogatives of privilege.  Analytic philosophy, I submit, in
encouraging a fantasy of unlocatedness, confers this privilege
on everyone.
There is a great deal more I’d like to say about the ways in
which the “male” aspects of analytic philosophy facilitated my
own development as a feminist, and simply as a person, but
I’ll forebear.  Let me just conclude by acknowledging two
things: first, that power and freedom are hardly uncomplicated
things, and hardly unequivocal goods.  I insist only that they
are goods of some sort.  Second, I recognize that the fantasies
I’ve been describing are fantasies.  I know that reason does
not always prevail, and I know that the vicious often claim it,
with impunity, as their own.  Finally, I recognize that all
cognitive activity  — because all activity — is materially located,
that we cannot literally leave our bodies behind.  I insist only
that it is a sort of tyranny to maintain that one must remember
this fact in everything one does.
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Introduction
What I want to look at is how feminism, conceived broadly as
the consciousness of sexism and other hierarchical systems
of oppression, whether coming out of analytic or continental
traditions, has revised philosophical discourse.1  Feminism
questions, criticizes, and subverts the main fields of philosophy.
Philosophical feminism is now itself a field — there are
courses, textbooks, and job ads that go by its name — but it is
a field rather on analogy with existentialism, not philosophy
of science or ethics.  That is, philosophical feminism is a
pervasive worldview, a system, not just a topic.  Thus, like
existentialism (or materialism or many other isms I could
name), feminism provides a lens for the revision of the entire
philosophical project.  Although philosophical feminism is still
a marginalized field in philosophy, there can be no reasonable
doubt that it has made its permanent marks on the discipline.
There are those who doubt that feminism has had such
an effect on philosophy, however.  Colin McGinn, in an article
in the Times Literary Supplement that was supposedly
assessing the effect that feminism has had in various
disciplines, claimed that “feminism now has a place in many
philosophy departments, for good or ill, but it has not made
any impact on the core areas of the subject.”2  Although I think
that the claim is so clearly false as not to be worthy of response,
the rest of this paper constitutes, as a by-product of its main
aim, a rebuttal.  I will begin with the assumption that feminism
has made very significant alterations in the terrain of
philosophy and show how the dialogue of analytic and
continental traditions within feminism has been fruitful in
making these revisions.  Analytic and continental traditions
may debate the ownership of feminism as well as the
ownership of philosophy generally.  Yet, within this debate we
can locate contributions from both sides not only to philosophy
generally, but to almost any understanding of feminism.
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In this paper I will illustrate some of the revisions of
philosophy that feminists have created and point to ways in
which the two traditions have complementary or converging
views.    As I see it, there are four main categories for the
revisions that feminism makes in substantial issues of
philosophy.  First, feminism revises the questions that are
approached philosophically.  That is, feminism adds to the
canon of interesting questions, and perhaps has shown some
to be uninteresting, as well.  What is a woman?  This is a whole
different question from Locke’s question: what is a man?3
Second, feminism sets the terms in which some debates can
be carried out.  A simple example: one cannot use sexist
language anymore without appearing to be picking a fight.  But
perhaps one will say that is not so much a philosophical point
as a political one.  Then consider: sex/gender, marginalization,
standpoint epistemology, intersectionality, gynandr y,
phallocentrism, the gaze, embodiment, care, dependency, and
on and on.  These are all words that have been added to the
philosopher’s professional vocabulary by feminism.  Third,
feminism revises the criteria of adequacy for theories.  Theories
of justice, ethical theory, and philosophy of science that once
looked plausible have come to be seen as implausible for what
they leave out, for answers that they cannot provide or
questions that they cannot address.  And fourth, feminism
affects the answers that are considered acceptable in
philosophical debate.  A sexist conclusion is no longer
acceptable in any but the most isolated and praetorian
philosophical community.   Accounts of autonomy, objectivity,
justice, or beauty can no longer assume the superiority or
centrality of maleness without being rejected for that reason
alone.  In the rest of this essay I will take up examples in the
first three categories (which also provide examples of the
fourth) to illustrate the dialogue of continental and analytic
feminist philosophy.
Questions
Here I shall take as my example the following question: How
does our bodily existence define (at least in part) the self?  This
is not a question completely unknown to philosophers before
feminism, but it was surely relatively unexplored territory on
the frontier before feminists began to investigate the question
of personhood.  To take one influential feminist on this issue,
Sandra Bartky has given us a continental-inspired analysis of
bodily existence and sexual objectification, and the resultant
shame that accompanies female selfhood.4  In doing so she
has helped make bodies, particularly women’s bodies and
how they affect women’s self-understanding, a primary topic
of philosophical concern.  In her article “Narcissism, Femininity
and Alienation,”5 Bartky argues for a feminist understanding
of the concept of alienation, which is typically in women a
kind of self-estrangement or self-oppression.  We in the
contemporary Western world do that through our participation
in and the internalization of the “fashion-beauty complex,”
which inspires in women the idea that we must be ever busy
improving our looks, which are never good enough.  Bartky
writes:
I must cream my body with a thousand creams, each
designed to act against a different deficiency, oil it,
pumice it, shave it, pluck it, depilate it, deodorize it,
ooze it into just the right foundation, reduce it through
spartan dieting or else pump it up with silicon…
There is no “dead time” in my day during which I do
not stand under the imperative to improve myself.6
This imperative that we feel creates and reinforces in us
the idea that we are inferior bodies, that we (unlike men) need
to pay constant attention to our looks in order to be acceptable.
Feminine narcissism just is, according to Bartky, “infatuation
with an inferiorized body.”7  The result for women is a pervasive
sense of shame, which Bartky sees as the dominant emotion
in most women.  Shame pervades our sense of ourselves; it is
the ever-present feeling for the female-embodied subject.
Bartky’s theory of shame shows us how a predominant
emotion can color our deepest sense of self.8  To understand
the self, then, we must look to what our particular form of
embodiment means in our cultures.
While Bartky draws largely on psychoanalytic and
existentialist traditions for her penetrating analysis of female
embodiment, Susan Brison’s work on the effects of physical
violence on the self draws mainly on work in cognitive and
clinical psychology.  In Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking
of a Self, Brison writes about her survival of a brutal rape and
attempted murder.9  Through the retelling of the event and its
psychological aftermath, she assesses the Lockean theory of
personal identity.  According to Locke, a person is a set of
continuous memories through time, so that when the prince’s
memories are placed in the cobbler’s body, the resulting
person is the prince.  Brison’s study of the effects of violence
in part affirms the possibility of a different person coming to
inhabit the body.  Even though the body is continuous with
the body before the attack, the person who is a victim of trauma
is inalterably changed.  After a traumatic event, that is, an event
in which one feels helpless in the face of what is perceived as
life-threatening force, victims often lose their memories of both
the event itself and of previous events in their lives.  She writes,
“Not only are one’s memories of an earlier life lost, along with
the ability to envision a future, but one’s basic cognitive and
emotional capacities are gone, or radically altered, as well.”10
Even if they regain those memories, as often happens, victims
often feel as if they are no longer the same person, or that
they are only the shell of a person.  These reactions are so
typical that they are part of the diagnosis of post-traumatic
stress disorder, a recognized psychological disorder with
recognized biochemical underpinnings.  (Prozac turns out to
be a helpful drug for many victims of post-traumatic stress
disorder).
Now to the extent that the person really has changed
through loss of memory and other cognitive and emotional
capacities, Locke’s theory has some validity.  But where Brison
clearly differs from Locke is in seeing how physical, bodily
trauma effects these changes in the self.  Brison shows that
the body is inseparable from the person just in the sense that
if we violently traumatize the body we change the person by
significantly altering the chemical and neurological bases for
personhood.
Although the traditional personal identity debate pits the
body theory against the mind theory, feminism asks deeper
questions about the way that embodiment affects the whole
being of the person, so that the divide between the traditional
theories of personhood are no longer viable.  Bartky’s analysis
shows us that our embodiment (within a social context)
causes our deepest sense of self to be in a particular affective
mode.  This belies the traditional thinking of mind theories of
personal identity, in which it is only the cognitive that matters.
Brison’s analysis further shows us that under the pressure of
bodily trauma the mental life of the self changes utterly.
Terms of the debate
Feminism has given us the sex/gender distinction, the most
profound clarification by philosophers of the 20th century.   The
distinction was first formulated and clarified as the distinction
between sex, conceived as natural or biological fact, and
therefore not constructed by social context, and gender,
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conceived as the socially constructed veneer on top of sexual
difference.  De Beauvoir’s famous statement at the beginning
of Book II of The Second Sex:  “One is not born, but rather
becomes, a woman.”11 is often recognized as the first explicit
statement of this distinction.  However, like that equally
profound mind/body distinction, feminists are also critical of
it.  Judith Butler, another continental feminist, argues in Gender
Trouble that gender is effectively determined by sex, so the
categories are not really distinct.12  Furthermore, sex is socially
constructed in part, as well, in that it is determined to be a
dimorphic category by the social significance invested in
reproduction and normative heterosexuality.
Although Butler makes an excellent point about
understanding sex/gender as a purely biological vs. social
distinction, feminists have found that there is more to “gender”
than her analysis allows.  Sally Haslanger, in her “Gender and
Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?”
argues that gender is primarily to be understood as a
hierarchical system based on presumed sex.13  That is, if
someone is presumed to be male then he is accorded the
status of dominance vis-a-vis one who is presumed to be
female.  Hence, what the category gender adds to the
apparently neutral biological sex distinction is the notion of
hierarchy.  Uncovering gender now is uncovering injustice.
Feminists from both analytic and continental traditions
have created new meanings for the terms “sex” and “gender,”
and have shown that these terms are essential elements of
debates about justice as well as sex.
Criteria of adequacy
Traditionally, justice has only to do with public spheres of
politics, the courts, and the marketplace.  This is as true of
theories of justice of Kant, Hegel, and Habermas as it is of
those by Mill and Rawls.  On the traditional view, the private
spheres of home and intimate relationships are to be kept
separate from those of civic, political, and marketplace and
relations within the former are not to be judged by rules of
justice, which apply to the latter.  Feminists from both the
analytic and continental traditions have challenged this view
and established justice in the family as a primary test of the
adequacy of any theory of justice.
Susan Moller Okin, in Justice, Gender, and the Family,
argues that if we understand justice as fairness along Rawlsian
lines, then it is clear that there is a great deal of injustice in
families.14  This injustice is systematically suffered by women,
who are trapped in the domestic sphere, often as their second
or even third shift, by their lesser power within marriage.
Women have less power in marriage for several reasons, all
of which stem from traditional norms about women and
femininity.  Since these are due to impersonal and morally
arbitrary forces, they are unjust by liberal standards.  Hence, a
liberal theory of justice cannot be adequate unless it attends
to matters of justice in family structures.  There is yet a further
argument for this conclusion that Okin provides.  Families, she
points out, are the place where children develop their moral
and social capacities.  If they must learn about justice and
morality surrounded by unjust relations among family
members, then they may well come to mistake such relations
for inevitable, natural, loving, or perhaps even just
relationships.  Thus, a theory of justice that ignores family life
is likely to be undermined by the moral development of those
who follow it.
Eva Feder Kittay, in Love’s Labor, makes what she calls
the “dependency critique” of Rawls.15  Kittay argues that
dependency is a ubiquitous feature of human life, and all
persons will be dependent for some period of their lives.  Thus,
society must create ways for the dependent to be cared for.
In our society, as in most others, women are the primary
caregivers of the dependent, and women of lower social status
are even more likely than other women to spend much of their
lives giving care.  Furthermore, caregiving is accorded low
status, as symbolized in our society by the fact that it is either
unpaid or low paid labor.  Women do this caregiving labor
because they have been socialized to see it as their place and
their role, and because they have been trained to have the
emotional capacities and cognitive capacities necessary for
competent caring.  Kittay argues that because caring is
inevitable and ubiquitous, all persons should be capable and
obliged to care for others, and that this is a matter of justice.
The capacity to recognize need and give care is as basic, she
argues, as the two Rawlsian capacities of moral personhood:
the capacity to have a sense of the good and the capacity to
form a rational plan of life.  In sum, Kittay has shown that the
fact of human dependency cannot be ignored by any adequate
theory of justice.
Cynthia Willett takes up the theme of the development of
moral and social capacities and their connection to justice
from a continental, psychoanalytic perspective in her book,
The Soul of Justice.16  Here, and in her earlier book, Maternal
Ethics and Other Slave Moralities,17 Willett argues that
psychologists have demonstrated that human infants need
human, physical touch and face-to-face encounters.  Human
touch seems to be so important that infants who are denied
this often wither and die.  Physical, cognitive, and emotional
development can only be secured by adequate contact with
other human bodies.  This physico-social contact begins with
the fetal-maternal bond, and develops as the baby is born and
cared for in its early infancy and beyond.  By treating this
essential contact as primitive and pre-social, Willet argues,
caregiving labor is devalued.  Appropriating the language of
the psychoanalyst, Willett calls these bodily, physical
attachments “erotic” and “libidinal.” Yet she clearly
distinguishes her use of these terms from earlier Freudians.
She wishes to capture a notion of physicality and sensuality
that is not sexual or even quasi-sexual.  Rather, it is the physical
basis for sociality, and thus at the very root of our ability to
interact morally.  She writes:
The cradled baby yet unable to focus on the face of
another is driven by the desire to be rocked, caressed,
and held against the flesh of those who enjoy its
warmth in return.  The deprivation of touch, perhaps
more so than the other forms of sensory engagement,
hinders the libidinal development of the person.  The
infant who is deprived of touch can become
excessively withdrawn or even violent, and incapable
of sustaining social bonds in later life.18
Willett’s work beautifully exemplifies the revision of
philosophy through feminist sensibility.  She brings
embodiment into discourse about justice, and shows how
human animality is the source,  not shame, of our humanity
as the traditional fathers of philosophy have taught us.  We
can, I think, infer two points about the criteria of adequacy of
philosophical theories from this work: first, that a theory of
justice that does not take human physical need for touch and
personal, physical care into consideration is inadequate; and
second, any philosophical theory that ignores the body or treats
it as shameful is inadequate as a theory for human beings.
Conclusion
I want to close with one additional category of change that
feminism is effecting in philosophical discourse, and that is in
the manner of philosophical discussion and debate.  Now it is
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not true to say that feminists cannot be as strident in advocacy
as their philosophical forefathers. Recall the subject of the last
panel at American Philosophical Association Pacific Division
Meeting that was sponsored by the Society for Analytical
Feminism and the Society for Women in Philosophy, in which
we discussed the “rules of engagement” for feminists, against
the backdrop of Martha Nussbaum’s vigorous critique of Judith
Butler.19  But the fact that we debated whether that sort of
attack was legitimate is itself evidence that feminist
philosophers are adding the issue of the manner of debate to
the philosophical agenda.  The panel for which this essay was
written carries that debate forward.  In creating this panel we
hoped to bring out the meeting points of differing philosophical
traditions, traditions that have been pitted against each other
in ugly and unproductive ways.  Although I was trained in
graduate school by and mentored in my early career by
philosophers firmly wedded to the analytic tradition, and
jealous of any proposals by continentalists, since beginning to
work on philosophical feminism I have begun to recognize
the contributions that other traditions can make to my work.  I
thank feminists of all traditions for this continuing lesson in
philosophy and community.
Feminism is not only alive and well in philosophy—it is
revising philosophy.  Some non-feminist philosophers may
attempt to drag their feet, and backlash is certainly not
unknown, but as Anita Superson, (chair of and organizer of
the panel for which this paper was written), has put it
elsewhere, “The tide is coming.”20
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Liberating the Self from Oppression: A
Commentary on Multiple Feminist
Perspectives
Anita M. Superson
University of Kentucky
The four preceding powerful papers on the contributions of
feminism to philosophy span the spectrum from continental
philosophy, postmodernism, pragmatism, and hermeneutics,
to analytic philosophy.  There are points of similarity, and points
of difference.  One common theme that constitutes our
“meeting place” is a feminist conception of the self, particularly
as it relates to women’s oppression, which will be my focus
in this concluding paper.1
Cynthia Willett challenges the notion of the self defended
by autonomy theorists, who she classifies as liberal
philosophers from the analytic tradition.  This notion of the
self includes libertarian versions that focus on freedom from
unnecessary interference in the exercise of choice, Rawlsian
versions that focus on the capacity for rational self-legislation,
and modified versions such as that discussed by Mackenzie
and Stoljar, who take the core of the self to be “the capacity
for reflection on one’s motivational structure and the capacity
to change it in response to reflection.”2  The idea of the latter,
more developed, view is that only those preferences we find
ourselves having that survive a test of autonomous reflection
are the ones that are our own, and that define the self.  This
theory of the self can be seen as responsive to oppression, for
if our preferences are ones we come to have due largely to
the influences of patriarchy, a promising way to eradicate or
modify these heteronomous, deformed preferences is through
rational reflection, such that those remaining will be ones that
constitute the core of the autonomous self.
Willett notes that the autonomy theory of the self has been
criticized as being too individualistic, and not sufficiently
sensitive to and reflective of a person’s social connectedness.
Autonomy theorists have responded to this charge by claiming
that persons and their preferences are, indeed, constituted by
their social relations.  According to Mackenzie and Stoljar, they
typically have cashed this out as a psychological point about
how a person may understand her identity.  In particular, they
believe that only certain elements of the psychological makeup
of a person, namely, those relating to self-esteem and self-
trust, are produced heteronomously by social relations.  In
other words, care and nurturance from others are needed for
a person to develop self-esteem and self-trust, and once she
acquires these skills or attitudes, she can go on to make
autonomous choices, and determine her preferences in a way
that enables her to reject patriarchy’s influences.  One obvious
problem with this view, which I believe Willett acknowledges,
is that our very notions of self-esteem and self-trust might be
infused with patriarchal influences such that, even when  they
are supplemented with rational reflection, they might not
screen out deformed preferences.  Willett finds this view
